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Abstract
This research paper is an analysis of the case United States v Flick et al which took place in 1947 in 
Nuremberg, Germany. Friedrich Flick, a powerful German industrialist, and several high ranking 
officials of his firm were tried by a United States military tribunal for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed during the Third Reich. The proceedings and the decision itself are the subject 
of a critical examination, including an investigation of the factual and legal background. The trial 
will be regarded in the historical context of prosecutions against German industrialists after World 
War II. Seen from present-day perspective, the question will be raised whether any conclusions can 
be drawn from the Flick case in respect of the substance of present-day international criminal law.   
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Introduction
On 22 December 1947, German industrialist Friedrich Flick was sentenced by a 
United States military tribunal in Nuremberg to seven years' imprisonment for 
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Nazi era. Two high-
ranking officials of the Flick concern were convicted as well, while three others were 
acquitted. This court's decision was the result of a trial which lasted for over nine 
months. The official judgement consists of over 1200 pages,1 the complete trial 
protocols amount to 11,026 pages.2
The purpose of the research paper at hand is to conduct a legal historical analysis of 
the case. Hence, the court’s decision is the main focus of this study. The factual and 
legal background of the trial will be examined, as well as the political context and the 
relevance for present-day international criminal law.
The first chapter will illuminate the factual background of the Flick case by giving an 
overview of  the involvement of the Flick firm with the Nazi system, focusing on the 
rearmament, spoliation, the forcible acquisition of Jewish property (“Aryanisation”) 
and the forced labour policy.
In the second chapter, the legal setting for the Flick trial shall be outlined. Different 
legal approaches to holding German big businesses accountable were discussed 
amongst the Allies. The chapter explores why trials of individuals where chosen in-
stead of other possible options, and why Friedrich Flick and the other five defendants 
were selected by the prosecution.
The trial itself is the main topic of the third chapter, covering the period from 15 
March 1947 when Flick and five others were officially indicted, until 22 December 
1947, the date of the court's final judgement. The several counts, their foundation in 
1 See Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law 
No. 10 – Vol. 6. Digital version available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NTs_war-
criminals.html (accessed on 19 October 2010). In the following referred to as “Flick Trial”. 
2 See Flick Trial 4. The unpublished version of the trial protocols is currently only available on 
microfilm, see: Jung, Susanne: Die Rechtsprobleme der Nürnberger Prozesse: dargestellt am 
Verfahren gegen Friedrich Flick, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (1992) 251.
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Control Council Law No. 10 as well as the  strategies and arguments brought up by 
prosecution and defence with regard to the major legal problems (for example the 
question of necessity) will be scrutinised. Finally the court's decision and reasoning 
shall be examined.  
The fourth chapter will put the Flick trial in context with the other business cases in 
post-World War II jurisdiction. Other businessmen were prosecuted for their involve-
ment in the Nazi system, for example in the Krupp and the I.G. Farben cases. The 
analysis focuses on the question if and in how far the outcomes of these business tri-
als were influenced by the changing political climate in the emerging Cold War. 
In the fifth and last chapter, the Flick trial shall be critically examined from the per-
spective of present-day international criminal law. How persuasive was the court's 
reasoning? Which, if any, conclusions can be drawn from this case? Thus, the relev-
ance of the Flick case for the interpretation of international criminal norms and for the 
substance of customary international law shall be discussed.
Chapter One: National-Socialist Germany and the Flick Concern
1. Prologue – Development of the Flick Concern before 1933
Friedrich Flick was born in 1883 as a child of farmers in the German province of the 
Siegerland.3 He received merchant training for two years and after his first employ-
ment in a small mine, he quickly became part of the management of a local mining 
company, the Charlottenhütte.4 Being appointed the director of the company consti-
tuted the early basis for Flick's later economic rise.  
In this position, by means of modernisation, restructuring and successful contractual 
negotiations Flick achieved to raise the company's profits significantly. At the same 
time, he became silent partner in a friend's scrap metal dealing business. By granting 
advantageous contractual conditions to this scrap dealing company, Flick was able to 
3 See Ferencz, Benjamin B.: Lohn des Grauens; die verweigerte Entschädigung für jüdische 
Zwangsarbeiter, Frankfurt/New York, Campus Verlag (1986) 196.
4 See Ferencz (1986: 196); Priemel, Kim Christian: Flick: Eine Konzerngeschichte vom Kaiserreich 
bis zur Bundesrepublik, Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag (2007) 53 et seq.
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realise quite an amount of private profits, which went far beyond his actual director's 
salary.5 These profits he then used to acquire stocks of the mining company of which 
he was the director. In order to achieve this secretly, Flick made use of several straw 
persons. Eventually, Flick himself became the majority stockholder of the company.
In the following years, Flick was able to expand his business activities, by acquiring 
several other steel and coal mines and spreading out into other industrial areas. But 
the most important factor allowing Flick to become Germany's richest industrialist 
was yet to come. In 1914, World War I started and in the following years, the demand 
for steel and other products of Flick's companies by the German military increased 
many times over.6
One particular strategy used by Flick can already be observed at this stage and was 
employed several times under very different political situations in the later course of 
events. By using quite sophisticated means, Flick was able to convince high ranking 
political decision makers that several of his private business activities were in fact in 
the public interest and indeed questions of “state necessity”.7 Unquestionably, all ma-
jor producers in the steel industry made huge profits during these times. But by pic-
turing how essential his companies were for the overall success of the German army 
in World War I Flick managed to receive certain concessions, which placed him in 
the position of a quasi-monopolist in some areas.8 
In the 1920s, Flick's business activities expanded further and he became the owner of 
a major industrial conglomerate, consisting of various corporations and subsidiaries, 
commonly referred to as the “Flick Concern”.9
5 See Priemel (2007: 58 et seq.). 
6 See Priemel (2007: 119).
7 See Priemel (2007: 86).
8 See Priemel (2007: 71 et seq.).
9 See Priemel (2007: 106 et seq.). The German term “Konzern” describes a large business entity, 
similar to a trust. The English term “Concern”, though not too often found in everyday language, 
has been employed by the parties and the judges in the Flick trial (see for example Flick Judgement 
p. 176) and a number of academics (see for example Stallbaumer, Lisa M.: Big Business and the 
Persecution of the Jews: The Flick Concern and the "Aryanization" of Jewish Property Before the 
War, in: Holocaust and Genocide Studies (1999), Vol. 13 [pp. 1 – 27]). In the following, the term 
“Concern” will be used as as general reference to Friedrich Flick's industrial empire. 
- 3 -
 
 
 
 
While his companies were growing even larger during the time of the Weimar Repub-
lic, the world economic crisis of 1930 led the whole Flick Concern to a near bank-
ruptcy.10 Unlike many other German steel industrialists, Flick could not rely on huge 
assets or savings, as his main strategy was focused on expansion.11 His way of escap-
ing this difficult situation is another example of the aforementioned strategy and led 
to what was called the “Terberger scandal”.12 Flick managed to create an illusionary 
threat of a takeover of his companies by the French and thus persuaded the German 
government to purchase his depreciated industrial shares in the German city of 
Gelsenkirchen at par value.13
Without a doubt, Flick was a brilliant businessman and an economic genius. But, on 
the other hand, he was rather unscrupulous and ready to use illegal means to further 
his own success.14 
2. Early Support of the NSDAP
Flick's connections to the German Nazi party NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) can be traced back early. Financial support by Flick's com-
pany can already be observed before Hitler became appointed Reich Chancellor on 30 
January 1933. In 1932, Flick donated 150.000 Reichsmark to the NSDAP's electoral 
campaign.15 However, as part of his political lobbying, Flick contributed to other 
parties including the Social Democratic Party as well, although the donations concen-
trated on the conservative parties.16 
Also in 1932, Flick became a member of a group of industrialists initially called the 
“Keppler Circle”. Initiated by Hitler, this group was assembled in order to ensure the 
10 See Lippman, Matthew: War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The "Other Schindlers," in: 
Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, (1995), (pp. 173 – 267), p. 188; Priemel 
(2007: 179 et seq.).
11 See Priemel (2007: 220).
12 See Priemel (2007: 237 et seq.).
13 See Lippman (1995: 188); Priemel (2007: 237 et seq.). 
14 See for example Ferencz (1986: 196), stating that Flick's stock manipulations and ruthless way of 
acquiring property enabled him to become the sole owner of one of the biggest companies in the 
world. 
15 See Lippman (1995: 188).
16 See Bähr, Johannes et al: Der Flick-Konzern im Dritten Reich, München, Oldenbourger 
Wissenschaftsverlag (2008) 52.
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cooperation between the Nazi political leadership and like-minded powerful industri-
alists.17 Later renamed into the “Circle of Friends of Heinrich Himmler”, this group in 
particular furthered the activities of the infamous Nazi security police SS by way of 
financial funding. Friedrich Flick himself paid an annual sum of 100.000 Reichsmark 
to the SS since 1933.18 As a component of this membership, Flick personally visited 
the Concentration Camp of Dachau in 1936.19
From an economical point of view, Flick's efforts to establish good relationships with 
the Nazi government were a success story. Some measures of the new regime, such as 
the abolition of trade unions, were directly in the interests of the leading figures in the 
German industry.20
Already by the end of 1933, the Flick's Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke GmbH signed sev-
eral contracts with the new government over the manufacturing of bombs, artillery 
ammunition and gun barrels.21 With support of Reich minister Göring, Flick increased 
the production of military air-planes in his facilities in Leipzig in the same year as 
well.22 
Hitler's plans of expanding German territory, so called living-space (Lebensraum) by 
military means were already contained in his 1925 tract “Mein Kampf”.23 Immedi-
ately after his rise to power, he made clear that building up a forceful military re-
quired a strong industrial foundation.24 The general policy to achieve this goal was the 
concept of a “Wehrwirtschaft” (“defence economy”). Accordingly, German industry 
was put under the control of the Reich Chamber of Economics and regional coordin-
ating bodies were established consisting of business as well as state officials.25 Flick 
17 See Lippmann (195: 188).
18 See Stallbaumer, Lisa M.: Frederick Flick's Opportunism and Expediency, in: Dimensions - A 
Journal of Holocaust Studies Vol. 13, No. 2; See Drobisch, Klaus: Der Prozess gegen Industrielle  
(gegen Friedrich Flick und andere), in: G. R. Ueberschär (ed.), Der Nationalsozialismus vor 
Gericht. Die alliierten Prozesse gegen Kriegsverbrecher und Soldaten 1943-1952, pp. 121 – 132, 
Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag (1999) 127.
19 See Flick Trial 1218; Danner, Allision Marston: The Nuremberg Industrialist Prosecutions and 
Aggressive War, in: Virginia Journal of International Law (2006), (pp. 651- 676) 200.
20 See Lippman (1995: 188).
21 See Drobisch (1999: 123).
22 See Drobisch (1999: 123).
23 See Lippman (1995: 176).
24 See Lippman (1995: 176).
25 See Lippman (1995: 176).
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himself and a number of other high-ranking officials of the Flick company were ap-
pointed Wehrwirtschaftsführer (“defence economy leaders”).26 
3. Aryanisation of Jewish Property
Another policy of the Nazi regime, which gave Flick the opportunity to make huge 
profits and to increase his wealth was the expropriation of Jewish property, the so-
called Aryanisation.27 Immediately after Hitler's rise to power, the systematic discrim-
ination and persecution of Jewish citizens began. By legal and non-legal measures, 
step-by-step Jews were deprived of their citizen rights, inter alia by prohibiting them 
to hold certain public functions or to carry out their learned professions. One part of 
this anti-Semitic state policy was the Aryanisation, an euphemistic term for the forced 
transfer of property from their Jewish owners to “Aryans”, i.e. non-Jewish Germans.  
Friedrich Flick himself was probably neither an ideological National Socialist nor a 
convinced anti-Semite.28 However, he quickly recognized that the anti-Jewish devel-
opments in Germany created the opportunity to further expand his business empire.29 
A number of lucrative steel manufacturing companies, mines and arms factories had 
Jewish owners and Flick was not willing to have his competitors get all the advant-
ages out of this re-distribution program.30 Altogether, the Flick Concern was involved 
in four Aryanisation projects: The Simson arms factory, the Lübeck blast furnace and 
the Julius and Ignatz Petschek enterprises.31
However, it would be misleading and inaccurate to describe these Aryanisations 
simply as a combined effort of the Flick Concern and the Nazi government to get hold 
of Jewish property, as some historians have suggested and as the prosecution in the 
later trial seemed to have approached the issue.32 
26 See Drobisch (1999: 122).
27 See Priemel (2007: 430); Drobisch (1999: 126). 
28 See Jung (1992: 27); but see also Stallbaumer (1999: 3), who observes hints for an anti-Semitic 
attitude, but leaves the issue eventually open.
29 See Stallbaumer (1999: 4).
30 See Stallbaumer (1999: 3).
31 See Stallbaumer (1999: 2).
32 See Stallbaumer (1999: 1).
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Instead, the leading factor for Flick seemed to have been profit orientation and oppor-
tunism and he continuously adapted his approaches to the changing political circum-
stances.33 
Being a Jewish-owned arms facility, the Simson factories came into the focus of the 
Nazis as soon as 1934.34 At that time, many Jews had not conceived the full scale of 
the Nazi threat, also because the Nazi government was still taking regard of its inter-
national reputation.35 The owner, Artur Simson was intimidated by Nazi officials, 
inter alia for alleged tax violations, and eventually agreed that the company was be-
ing placed under trusteeship. The Nazi official in charge of this issue, Wilhelm Kep-
pler, decided that Flick was appointed for the position of a trustee.36 Although Flick's 
final goal was to become himself the owner of the factory, he ultimately failed in his 
attempts when the property was transferred to a state-owned foundation in 1935.37 
The anti-Jewish policy in Germany rapidly radicalised in the following years, and 
Flick made extensive use of this political climate when he entered into negotiations 
with the Julius Petschek group in 1938.38 By Flick's pointing out numerous times that 
the groups mines and factories were soon being expropriated by the government, the 
owners finally agreed to sell to the Flick Concern for a price half the actual value.39 
The same strategy was then used in respect of the Ignaz Petschek group. But the own-
ers, in contrast, were far more reluctant to accept a completely unreasonable price 
despite lengthy negotiations.40 After the Reich Pogrom Night and the radicalisation of 
foreign politics, however, the Nazi government had no need for taking regard of its 
international reputation anymore and expropriated the Ignatz Petschek group.41 But 
due to his political networking, Flick managed to acquire the property afterwards 
33 See Priemel (2007: 352); Stallbaumer (1999: 2, 4).
34 See Stallbaumer (1999: 5).
35 See Stallbaumer (1999: 3).
36 See Stallbaumer (1999: 5).
37 See Stallbaumer (1999: 5); Priemel (2007: 352).
38 See Bähr et al (2008: 323 et seq.) for a detailled analysis.
39 See Stallbaumer (1999: 4).
40 See Bähr et al (2008: 343 et seq.).
41 See Stallbaumer (1999: 5).
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from the German state in exchange for some of his hard coal mines.42 It is noteworthy 
that a representative of Göring mentioned to Flick's proxy Steinbrinck in 1938 that 
the ownership of these objects might one day be tried before an international court.43 
The profits from the sale of iron, steel and military goods of the Flick Concern in-
creased dramatically in the 1930's due to the rearmament policy. But economic histor-
ians have assessed that the company's expansion and increased production could have 
never been financed without the Aryanisation policy.44 In-depth studies conducted re-
cently have revealed that Flick played a very active, planning role, often even superi-
or to the involved state officials, especially in the Aryanisation of the Julius Petschek 
and the Ignatz Petschek groups.45
4. Forced Labour
Probably the most infamous part of the Flick company's history during the Third 
Reich was its large-scale use of forced labour.46 Between 1939 and 1945, every manu-
facturing branch of the Flick company without exception used forced labourers for 
their wartime production.47 The majority of them were citizens of the occupied coun-
tries of Western and Eastern Europe who were forcibly removed from their home 
countries in order to work in the German Reich. Additionally, prisoners of war and 
concentration camp inmates were involuntarily employed in the Flick company's 
mines, production facilities and other branches.48 By 1944, over half of the 120.000 
employees of the Flick Concern were forced labourers.49 More than 60. 000 prisoners 
of war and civil workers from foreign countries as well as 1000 concentration camp 
inmates had to work under inhuman living conditions.50 Many died from exhaustion 
and numerous diseases; others were maltreated and executed by the SS for refusal to 
42 See Drobisch (1999: 127). See Bähr et al (2008: 343 et seq. ) for a detailled analysis.
43 See Drobisch (1999: 127).
44 See Priemel (2007: 431).
45 See Priemel (2007: 431).
46 See Priemel (2007: 502); Drobisch (1999: 123); Ferencz (1986: 100). 
47 See Priemel (2007: 503).
48 See Priemel (2007: 502 et seq.).
49 See Drobisch (1999: 123).
50 See Drobisch (1999: 123). See Bähr et al (2008: 548 et seq.) for a detailed analysis of the forced 
labourers' living conditions. 
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work or for a breach of the discriminatory and draconic Nazi laws governing forced 
labour.51 This usually occurred with full knowledge of the local directors.52 An illus-
tration can be taken from the testimony of a former SS officer, stating that concentra-
tion camp inmates in a specific factory of the Flick Concern were in fact incapable to 
work due to frozen limbs and open wounds. In the case of children spitting blood, the 
local directors called it the “symptoms of a cold”.53   
Although the forced labour programme was initiated and tightly regulated by the Nazi 
government, Flick and his associates still had some freedom of decision-making 
within this framework.54 For instance, any improvements of the living conditions 
would have been clearly possible under the NS regime; however no such efforts 
whatsoever can be noticed.55 The guiding principle was economic expansion and the 
fate of these workers was irrelevant from this perspective.56 In some cases, 
concentration camp inmates were specifically demanded, because the wide range of 
disciplinary measures was anticipated to ensure a better performance of these 
people.57
The management of the Flick Concern usually left the concrete organisation of how 
the forced labourers were employed and treated to the local directors.58 But Flick and 
his authorised representatives were in most instances fully informed about the use of 
forced labour in the different branches of the Concern.59
5. The Flick Concern in Occupied Countries
In the early years of World War II, German troops had noticeable military success. 
With its Blitzkrieg strategy, the German army conquered large foreign territories both 
in the east and west of the German Reich. The military occupation of France, Poland 
51 See Bähr et al (2008: 549).
52 See Bähr et al (2008: 555).
53 See Bähr et al (2008: 555).
54 See Priemel (2007: 504).
55 See Priemel (2007: 505).
56 See Priemel (2007: 503).
57 See Priemel (2007: 504).
58 See Priemel (2007:  505).
59 See Priemel (2007: 505).
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and other countries meant that the German government also gained control of the in-
dustrial premises in these countries. Flick and his companions quickly recognised this 
as an opportunity to expand their business activities.60
After the German invasion of Poland, Flick tried to get hold of the Bismarck smeltery 
in Kattowice, but it was allocated to the Krupp Concern by the Nazi administration.61 
In lengthy negotiations with the Reich government, Flick planned to take over steel 
production facilities in the occupied Ukraine. However, when a joint venture between 
the Flick Concern and the state-owned Herrman Göring Works was set up for this 
purpose in early 1943,62 the retreat of the German army put an end to these efforts 
shortly after the actual production had started.63 Nevertheless, around 13.000 tons of 
machinery were removed from the factories and brought to companies situated within 
the German Reich.64 
In 1940, within days after the French troops were defeated, the Flick Concern was 
seeking to expand into the eastern part of France, the Alsace.65 Unlike in Eastern 
Europe, these efforts were successful with regard to the Rombach facilities.66 Due to 
his advanced political connections, Flick succeeded over his competitors and Her-
rman Göring personally allocated the Rombach facilities to Flick.67 During the negoti-
ations, Flick in particular referred to his “successful” purchase of the aryanised Ignatz 
Petschek companies.68 The Concern was granted a trusteeship over the factories and 
the 7000 employers, but they were basically treated as own property.69 A complete ac-
quisition of the facilities was targeted from the very beginning,70 but did eventually 
not occur due to the liberation of France by the Western Allies.
60 See Priemel (2007: 430 et seq.).
61 See Bähr et al (2008: 466).
62 The so-called Dnjepr-Stahl-GmbH, see Ahrens, Ralf, in: Lillteicher, Jürgen (ed.): Profiteure des  
NS-Systems?: Deutsche Unternehmen und das „Dritte Reich“, Berlin, Nicolai Verlag (2006) 140.
63 See Bähr et al (2008: 430).
64 See Drobisch (1999: 125).
65 See Bähr et al (2008: 462).
66 See Bähr et al (2008: 439 et seq.) for a detailed analysis of the Rombach case.
67 See Bähr et al (2008: 462). 
68 See Bähr et al (2008: 462).
69 See Drobisch (1999: 124).
70 See Bähr et al (2008: 463).
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In summary, the assets of the Flick Concern increased from 225 million to 953 mil-
lion Reichsmark between 1933 and 1943, basically a quadruplication.71 The annual 
turnover of the companies during World War II is estimated around 550 million 
Reichsmark.72 Friedrich Flick himself had become Germany's wealthiest man, with 
estimated personal assets of 3 billion Reichsmark.73  
Chapter Two: The Road to the Flick Case: Allied Plans for Business Trials
1. Initial Plans to Prosecute German Big Business
During World War II, public knowledge regarding the involvement of German big 
business with the Nazi regime's crimes was widespread among the Allied nations.74 
Due to the hundreds of thousands of slave labourers transported throughout Europe, a 
large amount of information on the business practices of German companies flooded 
through many different channels into several foreign countries.75 In addition to the 
quantity of cases in which German firms were involved in inhuman treatment and in-
ternational crimes, the public's perception in the U.S. and other Allied countries was 
especially influenced by reports of extraordinary vicious business conduct such as the 
distribution of poison gas Zyklon B to the concentration camp Auschwitz by a Ger-
man chemical company.76 However, for the majority of the public these war-time 
activities were not the primarily condemnable behaviour of German big business. For 
most observers, the main guilt was seen in the early financial support of Hitler and his 
Nazi party.77 
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that as soon as the Allies initiated plans to con-
duct war crime trials, these plans already included the idea that major German busi-
71 See Bähr et al (2008: 740).
72 See Drobisch (1999: 121).
73 See Drobisch (1999: 121).
74 See Bush, Jonathan A.: The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal 
Law: What Nuremberg really said, in: Columbia Law Review (2009) Vol. 109, (pp. 1094 – 1262) 
1105.
75 See Bush (2009: 1105).
76 See Bush (2009: 1105). See also below, Chapter Four – 1. Further Trials of Industrialists (39).
77 See Bush (2009: 1105).
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ness leaders needed to be held accountable for their crimes as well.78 In autumn 1942, 
the Western Allies set up the United Nations War Crimes Commission, which began 
collecting documents on the occurrence of war crimes and drafted a list of potential 
suspects to be tried before a war crime tribunal.79 In November 1943, Churchill, 
Roosevelt and Stalin issued the Moscow Declaration, expressing their will to prosec-
ute Nazi perpetrators.80
These efforts became more concrete in summer 1944, when British and American 
troops achieved military victories on the western front and advanced towards German 
territory.81 Although the general idea of prosecuting German war crimes was shared 
among the Allies, the leading force  working on the institutional prerequisites to hold 
such trials and conducting most investigations where the United States.82 Under the 
roof of the Office of Military Government for Germany, United States (OMGUS), 
which handled all Germany-related political questions, several teams were appointed 
with different tasks such as de-cartelisation, economic development and investigating 
war crimes.83 
OMGUS itself was staffed by members of all different U.S. institutions, inter alia by 
officials from the Foreign Office, the Departments of Finance, the War Department 
and the White House.84 The opinions on the issue of how to deal with German indus-
trialists who were involved in Nazi crimes differed significantly between these insti-
tutions and therefore among the staff of OMGUS as well.85 Substantial tensions exis-
ted especially between the policies of the Financial and the War Department. The Fin-
ancial Department under Henry Morgenthau followed a strong anti-trust plan of ac-
tion and is today primarily known for the idea of a complete de-industrialisation of 
78 See Bush (2009: 1105).
79 See Ahrens (2006: 131). 
80 See Declaration on German Atrocities [Moscow Declaration], released on 1 November 1943, in: 
Flick Trial X.
81 See Ahrens (2006: 131).
82 See Ahrens (2006: 131).
83 See Bähr et al (2008: 571).
84 See Bähr et al (2008: 571).
85 For an in-depth analysis, see Bush (2009: 1130 et seq.).
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Germany (the so-called Morgenthau plan)86. Morgenthau himself also favoured the 
summary execution of high-level Nazi leaders instead of holding lengthy and costly 
trials with unpredictable outcomes.87 The War Department on the other hand gener-
ally supported criminal tribunals, but had already been concerned during wartime that 
German industry might be needed in the future to build up a strong defence against 
communist influence.88
As the whole matter was controversial not only between the Allied countries but also 
within state institutions, the approach of holding German industrialists criminally re-
sponsible did not pursue a clear-cut strategy but was to become a dynamic process 
with significant shifts in the following years.89
2. Indictment and Dismissal of Krupp in the First Nuremberg Trial
In case of the preparations for the Trial of the Major War Criminals in Nuremberg 
(IMT),90initially  it was in fact a strong agreement between the four Allies that at least 
one representative of German industry would have to stand trial. Nevertheless, no 
such private business representative was tried before the IMT in the end, due to a 
rather unfortunate chain of events and miscommunication.91
At first, the heads of the four allied delegations rather quickly agreed upon putting 
Krupp on the list of the defendants at the IMT.92 It turned out, however, that the Brit-
ish and the Americans had two different Krupps in mind. The British representative 
Shawcross on the one hand wanted to indict the father, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und 
Halbach, who had led the Krupp corporation in the 1930's and was known to have a 
very close relationship to the Nazi regime in its initial phases. The U.S. prosecutor 
Robert Jackson on the other hand had the son, Alfried Krupp, in mind who took over 
86 See Jung (1992: 10).
87 See Ahrens (2006: 130).
88 See Ahrens (2006: 131).
89 See Bush (2009: 1103).
90 See The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal 
sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (1950). In the following referred to as “IMT Judgement”.
91 See Frei, Norbert / Ahrens, Ralf / Osterloh, Jörg / Schanetzky, Tim: Flick - Der Konzern, die 
Familie, die Macht, München, Karl Blessing Verlag (2009) 406; Bush (2009: 1112).
92 See Bush (2009: 1111). 
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the control in 1943.93 This miscommunication eventually led to the situation that the 
father, Gustav Krupp, was put on the list for the trial at the IMT. Gustav Krupp 
however was already an elderly person and just shortly before the trial at the IMT was 
about to begin, it became clear that Gustav Krupp was suffering from dementia and it 
was seen as very unlikely that he would be able to stand trial at all.94 Recognising that 
in this constellation, no representative of the German industry was to be tried before 
the IMT, Jackson tried to convince the other Allies to put Alfried Krupp on the list in-
stead of his father. But Shawcross was in strong opposition to this suggestion.95 The 
French however were rather desperate in the interest to put a member of the Krupp 
family on trial, as the Krupp company had established a devastating forced labour re-
gime in France during the time of German occupation, and even suggested to put 
Gustav's wife Berta on trial before the IMT.96 At last, this all led to the outcome that 
no German industrialist was tried at all. In the following years, both the American and 
British representatives each denied any own failures and tried to shift the responsibil-
ity on each other.97
The fact that no German industrialist had to stand trial before the IMT does not mean 
that the Trial of the Major War Criminals did not affect the Allied policy towards 
business trials. On the contrary, it had some negative impact on proposed future trials. 
This is especially true for the business-related case against former German Minister of 
Economics and President of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht.98 While one may well 
argue that it was not feasible indicting Schacht in the first place, as he was only influ-
ential during the first years of the Nazi regime but spent the last years in a concentra-
tion camp,99 his acquittal before the IMT definitely gave a negative precedent for oth-
93 See Bush (2009: 1112).
94 See Ahrens (2006: 132); Bower, Tom: 'Die Nürnberger Nachfolgeprozesse', in: Eisfeld, 
Rainer/Müller, Ingo (eds.), Gegen Barbarei: Essays Robert M.W. Kempner zu Ehren, Frankfurt am 
Main, Athenäum (1989) 239.
95 See Ahrens (2006: 132).
96 See Ahrens (2006: 132). One reason for this rather strange suggestion may also have been that a 
huge artillery gun produced by the Krupp company which was used to attack Paris in World War I 
was named “Dicke Bertha” after Krupps wife.  
97 See Bush (2009: 1112).
98 See IMT Judgement 124 et seq.
99 IMT Judgement 126.
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er business-related trials in the future.100 The weakness of this case was in fact pointed 
out by the IMT prosecutor Robert Jackson in later discussions on how German busi-
ness can be held criminally accountable.101
3. Another Nuremberg for Industrialists?
Although the idea to hold a complete international criminal trial solely against repres-
entatives of German industry and banks had come up some time earlier, it was fuelled 
again by the dismissal of Krupp in the trial of the major war criminals. Especially 
Telford Taylor, who was to become the successor of Robert Jackson and in this posi-
tion also the prosecutor in the Flick trial, very much favoured a second international 
military tribunal against German business.102 This never took place. Firstly, the Brit-
ish were very much opposed to this idea.103 In their opinion, war crime trials against 
industrialists were a rather dubious idea; mere commercial activity was not very much 
considered a crime and it was assumed that the role of the German industry was not 
too different from business companies for example in Britain or the U.S. This stand-
point, though, only seems understandable to a certain degree if one regards the re-
sponsibility of the German industry for the initiation and waging of aggressive war. 
However, German big business was responsible for a number of very severe criminal 
acts such as slave labour, where one cannot say at all that it was comparable to the 
conduct of, for example, the steel industrialists in Great Britain. 
While the British were opposed to a second international trial against industrialists, 
the Soviets strongly favoured such an approach. Their motivation at the time was also 
quite clear to the Western allies: such a trial was supposed to be a great opportunity to 
denounce private business and capitalism in general and be very helpful to communist 
propaganda.104 From Soviet perspective, the purpose of such trials was not to establish 
100 See Bush (2009: 1161).
101 See Bush (2009: 1124).
102 See Bush (2009: 1125).
103 See Bush (2009: 1127).
104 See Bush (2009: 1116).
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individual responsibility but rather to hold political show trials, similar to those in-
famous ones held in the Soviet Union in the 1930's under Stalin's notorious state pro-
secutor Wyschinski. Unsurprisingly, the Western allies did not want to give the Sovi-
ets such propagandistic opportunities.105 In May 1946, Jackson delivered a memor-
andum to U.S. president Truman, bringing up quite a number of arguments against a 
second international trial and also pointing out that such a trial was likely to have a 
negative impact on the cooperation of German military industry with the U.S. in the 
future.106
Apart from these political reasons, the idea of a second international military tribunal 
for industrialists was also given up for economical reasons.107 The lengthy trial before 
the IMT had already shown a number of disadvantages. With judges from France, 
Great Britain, U.S.A. and the Soviet Union and with German defendants, an enorm-
ous amount of documents had to be translated in several languages, which created 
quite some logistic problems. Having to pay for the judges, secretaries, guards, trans-
lators etc. over several months made the whole trial a rather cost-intensive enterprise. 
And the IMT had also shown that the interest of the media and the world community 
subsided gradually the more time the trial took and the more the participators where 
concerned with detail issues.
By September 1946, senior staff at the prosecutors' office became aware that no com-
plement international business trial was going to take place and that American zonal 
trials would have to serve as a substitute.108
4. Legal Debates: Conspiracy, Membership Liability and Corporate 
Liability
From a lawyer's perspective, it becomes of special interest to look at the legal debates 
which took place concerning the concrete approach to business trials.109 Under which 
105 See Wiesen, Jonathan S.: West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955, 
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press (2001) 69.
106 See Ahrens (2006: 133).
107 See Bush (2009: 1116).
108 See Bush (2009: 1129).
109 For an in-depth analysis, see Bush (2009: 1094 et seq.).
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legal theories and dogmatic approaches can economic actors be held criminally liable 
for committing crimes under international law? This question was in the 1940's and is 
still today very difficult to answer, as it touches and combines several different areas 
of criminal law, which are already complicated each for itself. 
Firstly, international criminal law in general usually deals with large-scale atrocities 
committed by a network of perpetrators.110 Traditional modes of participation de-
veloped under domestic criminal law do not serve as an adequate approach to estab-
lish individual responsibility of persons acting within a complex organisation such as 
a military unit or even a whole state.111 While present-day international criminal law 
has developed a number of sophisticated doctrinal approaches,112 the issue was only 
rudimentary set out in 1945/46.113 
Secondly, even under domestic criminal law it is a difficult task to determine if and 
under which circumstances business practices may be considered a criminal offence. 
This difficulty can be observed by taking a look at the still ongoing and controversial 
legal debates over so called “neutral acts”.114 Thus, holding industrialists liable for in-
ternational crimes was a task in the overlap of these complex legal fields.  
Furthermore, the prosecutors at Nuremberg had to work with fragmentary and incom-
plete legal provisions in this regard.115 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter reads as 
follows: “Leaders, organizers and accomplices in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible 
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan”.116 In addition, 
modes of participation were also included in the definition of the crimes itself.117 This 
110 See for example Werle, Gerhard: Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., The Hague, 
TMC Asser Press (2009), marginal no. 441.
111 See (2009: marginal no. 441). Eventually this led to several new legal approaches, for example the 
theory of the “perpetrator-by-means”, see Werle (2009: marginal nos. 451, 467).
112 See Article 25 (3) of the ICC Statute, furthermore Werle (2009: marginal no. 446).
113 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 442).
114 See for example Kudlich, Hans: Die Unterstützung fremder Straftaten durch berufsbedingtes  
Verhalten, Berlin, Duncker + Humblot (2004).
115 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 442).
116 Charter of the International Tribunal, Nuremberg, in: 39 American Journal of International Law 
(1945), Suppl. 257.
117 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 443).
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obscured the whole issue even more, as for example “conspiracy”, though contained 
in the general provision, was only included in the definition of “Crimes against 
Peace” and not into the other two international crimes of the IMT Charter.118 
Furthermore, Control Council Law No 10, the core legal basis for the Nuremberg fol-
low-up trials contained a very broad list of different modes of participation in Article 
II (2).119 
The prosecutor's team at Nuremberg around Robert Jackson and his successor Telford 
Taylor drafted several legal assessments on the preferable legal basis for business tri-
als.120 Basically three different theories were developed. The first approach was to in-
dict industrialists solely as individuals.121 Under the second approach, the membership 
liability provisions of the IMT Charter, respectively Control Council Law No 10 were 
to be used.122 Under this theory, industrial enterprises such as IG Farben and other 
huge German companies involved in Nazi crimes might be treated as criminal organ-
isations and the criminal liability of its leading staff could then be inferred from their 
membership within the company.123 The third, and presumably predominant approach 
among the prosecutors was to apply conspiracy theories.124 Conspiracy charges were 
successfully used in a number of domestic business-related cases in the U.S. before 
and it seemed to provide a solution to the problem that though large scale atrocities 
(such as the mass use of slave workers) were easily proven, there existed still a defi-
ciency of individualised documentary evidence.125 
While the trial against the Major War Criminals was still ongoing, the prosecutors in 
their preparations for future business trials put a strong focus on conspiracy 
charges.126 However, when the IMT issued its final judgement, these plans were 
118 See Bush (2009: 1139).
119 Control Council Law No.  10, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany No. 3, 31 
January 1945, pp. 50 et seq.; see Werle (2009: marginal no. 444). See below, Chapter 3, No. 5 b)  
Individual Accountability and Modes of Participation (28 et seq.), for a detailed examination. 
120 For a very detailed examination, see Bush (2009: 1130 et seq.).
121 See Bush (2009: 1136).
122 See Bush (2009: 1136).
123 See Bush (2009: 1147).
124 See Bush (2009: 1137). 
125 See Bush (2009: 1137 ).
126 See Bush (2009: 1140).
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thrown into disarray. In their decision, the judges at the IMT expressed some deep 
scepticism towards both conspiracy and membership charges. Although twenty-four 
defendants were charged with conspiracy, only eight were convicted on this count.127 
The judges did not find it adequate to assume a single Nazi conspiracy, pointing out 
that the indictment on the conspiracy charge covered a period of twenty-five years,128 
thus making it difficult to determine when the conspiracy actually started (In 1919 
with the formation of the NSDAP? In 1933 with Hitler's rise to power? With the initi-
ation of aggressive acts in Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1936-1938?). The judges 
therefore left it open whether such a general Nazi conspiracy existed, but emphasised 
that “conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose”.129 With respect to 
the ambiguous wording of Article 6 of the IMT Charter, the judges applied a restrict-
ive interpretation, stating that conspiracy is limited only to the crime of aggression 
and cannot be applied to crimes against humanity and war crimes.130
With regard to membership charges, the judges at the IMT also applied a narrow in-
terpretation.131   They stated that the application of membership liability “unless prop-
erly safeguarded, may produce great injustice”132 and emphasized that “criminal guilt  
is personal”.133 Some groups such as the General Staff and the High Command were 
deemed as too small,134 others such as the Reich Cabinet were regarded as being more 
of a titular than a functional group.135 
As a result, the prosecution at Nuremberg refrained from experimenting with conspir-
acy and membership liability approaches for their upcoming business trials and in-
stead resorted to traditional theories of individual liability.136 However, as a number of 
authors have examined, the idea of a conspiracy between German industry and the 
127 See Bush (2009: 1162).
128 See IMT Judgement 56.
129 See IMT Judgement 57.
130 See IMT Judgement 58.
131 See Bush (2009: 1146).
132 IMT Judgement 81.
133 IMT Judgement 82.
134 IMT Judgement 98.
135 IMT Judgement 97.
136 See Bush (2009: 1161 et seq.).
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Nazi leadership still seemed to be underlying most of the prosecutors' reasoning.137 
This aspect will be further scrutinised at a larger stage, as it was going to have a 
strong impact on the proceedings and the outcome of the upcoming Flick trial.
Summing up the findings, the IMT trial and judgement with the failed attempt to in-
dict Krupp, the acquittal of Schacht and the restrictive interpretation of the IMT 
Charter regarding conspiracy and membership liability established a rather unfavour-
able precedent for future business trials and put an end to some ambitious plans of the 
prosecution, already before these trials actually started.138 
5. Why Flick?
Friedrich Flick himself was taken into custody by the Allies on 13 June 1945.139 The 
criminal proceedings against him and his assistants constituted case number five of 
the Nuremberg follow-up trials140 and it was the first of the so-called industrialists' tri-
als. A multitude of reasons played a role as to why the prosecution actually chose this 
case to be the first business case and not, for example, indicted I.G. Farben or 
someone of the well-known Ruhr dynasties such as Alfried Krupp first. 
One reason was Flick's holding of public positions such as Wehrwirtschaftsführer. 
The prosecution misinterpreted this position as being of high political influence141, 
therefore Flick was assumed to be a prime example of a ruthless Nazi businessman. 
And while the traditional Ruhr dynasties had already an enormous amount of wealth 
decades before the Nazis actually took over power in Germany, Flick's incredibly fast 
economic rise created special suspicions.142  Furthermore, Flick was not only the own-
er of a gigantic business empire, he also held positions in other notorious German 
businesses like the Dresdner Bank AG.143 
137 See Ahrens (2006: 132); Bähr et al (2008: 565); Frei et al (2009: 404).
138 See Bush (2009: 1161).
139 Jung (1992: 7).
140 See Thieleke
141 See Bähr et al (2008: 564).
142 See Frei et al (2009: 413).
143 See Frei et al (2009: 403).
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Finally, putting Flick on trial first was also a pragmatic decision. At that stage, of all 
potential business trials most evidence had been gathered for a trial against Flick.144 
Indicting a single major industrialist (together with his associates) was deemed as an 
easier task than taking on a complex organisational enterprise such as the I.G. 
Farben.145
Chapter Three: The Trial U.S.A. v Flick et al
The Flick trial itself began on 15 March 1947, when the prosecution officially in-
dicted Flick and five other high-ranking members of his company. The court proceed-
ings took over nine months, by which time over 900 documents of evidence were 
presented by the prosecution and the defence146 and over 45 witnesses interrogated.147
The legal basis for the Flick trial was Control Council Law No 10.148 It was issued by 
the Allied Control Council on 20 December 1945 followed basically along the lines 
of IMT Charter.149 CCL No. 10 though only included material law provisions; the pro-
cedural provisions for the Flick trial were contained in ordinance No. 7 and ordinance 
No. 11 of the Military Government in the American Zone.150 These procedural norms 
were only set out rudimentarily and constituted a mix of continental and common law 
procedure.151
1. Defendants and Defence Counsel
As the leading figure of the Flick company, Friedrich Flick was the main defendant 
and focal point of the whole trial. But it was clear that not a single person was bearing 
all responsibility and consequently, five high-level assistants of Friedrich Flick were 
indicted, too. Otto Steinbrinck, born 1888, NSDAP and SS member, was Flick's chief 
assistant and in particular responsible for the company's relations to public adminis-
144 See Bush (2009: 1117).
145 See Bush (2009: 1117).
146 See Jung (1992: 81).
147 See Jung (1992: 83, FN 440).
148 See Flick Trial 11; Jung (1992: 23).
149 See Werle (2009: marginal nos. 35,36).
150 See Flick Trial XXIII; Jung (1992: 23).
151 See Jung (1992: 23).
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tration.152 Konrad Kaletsch, a cousin of Flick, entered the business enterprise in the 
early 1920s and became authorised representative in 1937.153 He also was a member 
of the NSDAP and appointed Wehrwirtschaftsführer.154 The fourth defendant, 
Bernhard Weiss was a nephew of Friedrich Flick who worked in the Flick company's 
headquarters in Berlin since 1939. He, too, was appointed authorised representative 
and his main area of operation was the organisation of the hard coal mines.155 Defend-
ant Odilo Burkart was a studied lawyer and the third authorised representative in the 
company. In his position, he was mainly concerned with the supervision of the iron 
and steel production as well as the brown coal mines.156 The last accused, Herman 
Terberger had not been employed at the Flick headquarters but was an executive 
board member in a large local meltery, the Maximilianhütte AG.157 Terberger was a 
member of the NSDAP, the SA as well as Wehrwirtschaftsführer.158
The defendants in the Flick trial were counselled and represented by a number of 
skilled and experienced German criminal defence lawyers.159 Even prosecutor Telford 
Taylor acknowledged in his closing statement the defendants' “very able and energet-
ic counsel”.160 Most of them had already worked as defence counsel before the IMT 
and thus were used to the Anglo-American adversarial procedure and had already 
gained some expertise in the field of international criminal law.161 
Former naval judge Dr. Otto Kranzbühler had defended Admiral Dönitz before the 
IMT.162 Dr. Hans Flaechsner had provided counsel for Albert Speer and Dr. Walter 
Siemers defended Raeder.163 Dr. Horst Pelckmann had defended the SS before the 
IMT.164 Dr. Rudolf Dix had even achieved an acquittal for his client Hjalmar 
152 See Jung (1992: 27); Drobisch (1999: 121).
153 See Jung (1992: 28); Drobisch (1999:  121).
154 See Jung (1992: 28).
155 See Jung (1992: 29); Drobisch (1999: 121).
156 See Jung (1992: 29).
157 See Drobisch (1999: 122).
158 See Jung (1992: 30).
159 See Bush (2009: 1218).
160 Flick Trial 971.
161 See Jung (1992: 38).
162 See IMT Judgement 5; Jung (1992: 38).
163 See IMT Judgement 5; Jung (1992: 38).
164 See IMT Judgement 6; Jung (1992: 38).
- 22 -
 
 
 
 
Schacht.165 Thus, defence counsel for Konrad Kaletsch, Dr. Herbert Nath was the only 
defence attorney in the Flick trial who had no prior practical experience in this specif-
ic legal field.
Furthermore, these six lawyers could rely upon assistance by the so-called Industry 
Office (“Industriebüro”).166 Being a joint cooperation of several powerful German in-
dustrialists, the Nuremberg-based Industry Office worked behind the scenes to create 
coherent interpretation of the role of German industry in the Nazi era which favoured 
their own position.167 In particular, the aim of the office was to ensure a unified de-
fence for those industrialists indicted before war crime tribunal, inter alia by collect-
ing documents, providing legal advice and engaging in public relations campaigns.168
2. Counts 
Flick and his associates were charged with several counts of war crimes (Control 
Council Law No 10 Article II, No 1 b) and crimes against humanity (Control Council 
Law No 10 Article II, No 1 c). The prosecution refrained from charging any of them 
with the crime of aggression for their support of the Nazi regime with all sorts of mil-
itary equipment, as the evidence was regarded as being too weak.169 The indictment 
reads as follows: 
Count One covered forced labour, enslavement, forced deportation and the use of 
prisoners of war in the arms production.170 
Count Two dealt with the plundering and spoliation of property in occupied coun-
tries.171 All defendants were charged with Count One and Two. 
Under Count Three, Flick, Kaletsch and Steinbrinck were indicted for the “Aryanisa-
tion” of Jewish property.172 According to the prosecution, the defendants' involvement 
165 See IMT Judgement 5, 127; Jung (1992: 38).
166 See Frei et al (2009: 418); Wiesen (2001: 70). 
167 See Wiesen (2001: 70).
168 See Wiesen (2001: 73); Priemel (2007: 633).
169 See Frei et al (2009: 415).
170 Flick Trial 13.
171 Flick Trial 17.
172 Flick Trial 21.
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in the Aryanisation process amounted to the crime against humanity of “persecutions 
on political, racial or religious grounds” according to CCL No. 10  Article II, No 1 
c.173 This count had great significance for the prosecutor's approach in the Nuremberg 
follow-up trials which were still to come, as it dealt with the legal question if and un-
der which prerequisites military tribunals had jurisdiction over crimes committed pri-
or to 1939, the beginning of World War II.174 
Under Count Four, Flick and Steinbrinck were charged with complicity in murder 
and other crimes for their support of the SS, in particular through Flick's membership 
in and support of the circle of friends of Heinrich Himmler.175 
Finally, Otto Steinbrinck was indicted under Count Five for his membership in the 
SS, according to CCL No. 10 Art II No 1 d.176 
3. Prosecution Strategy
After the resignation of Robert Jackson, Telford Taylor became chief of the prosecu-
tion authorities for the Nuremberg War Crime Trials. Taylor in this position also 
played an important role during the beginning and the end of the Flick trial; the day-
to-day work and most part of the litigation before the court however were done by his 
assistants Thomas E. Ervin, Charles S. Lyon and Edwin H. Sears.177
At first glance, it seems that the prosecution solely tried to prove individual criminal 
responsibility and thus abandoned any ideas of conspiracy or corporate liability.178 In 
contrast to the legal discussions on how to hold German business criminally account-
able as it had already been described, the wording of the indictment indeed seems to 
support this view. Only individuals were indicted and no effort was made to hold the 
Flick Concern as such, as a legal person, accountable. Additionally, at least at this 
point no reference is made to any kind of conspiracy. Although Count Four refers to 
173 Flick Trial 21.
174 See Weinke, Annette: Die Nürnberger Prozesse, München, C. H. Beck Verlag (2006) 85. 
175 Flick Trial 23.
176 Flick Trial 25.
177 See Jung (1992: 33).
178 See Frei et al (2009: 414). 
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membership liability, compared to the other counts this can be seen as a rather minor 
charge. 
Therefore, some authors suggested that “the change was complete” and the prosecu-
tion now only tried to establish criminal liability of individuals.179 However, if one 
does not focus exclusively on the wording of the indictment but on the whole prosec-
ution strategy and the argumentation before the court, a rather different image ap-
pears. Right from the beginning, the prosecution had put a strong focus on the overall 
structure of the company and especially on its political networking.180 On many occa-
sions, the prosecutors tried to emphasise the financial and ideological support given 
to the Nazi regime by the defendants.181 This point is very well illustrated by Telford 
Taylor's statement about the assumed “unholy trinity of nazism, militarism, and eco-
nomic imperialism”.182 
Thus, it can be said that the core idea guiding the prosecution was still a concept of 
conspiracy,183 though this was now rather implied than explicitly stated. To a large de-
gree, this idea is in accordance with the contemporary view of academics and politi-
cians on the relationship between German industry and the Nazi leadership. Since the 
1940's and for some decades, many historians indeed saw German industrialists as 
conspirators who intentionally helped Hitler to come to power (the so-called 
“Steigbügelhalter”) and furthermore were involved in many of the regime's crimes 
out of a similar ideology.184 And with respect to some individual representatives of 
German big business, such a assessment still holds today. However, a number of aca-
demic studies by historians and economists have revealed that the relationship 
between German industrialists and the Nazi leadership was of a more complex 
nature.185 In the reality of the Third Reich, many businessmen collaborating in hor-
179 See Bush (2009: 1177).
180 See Frei et al (2009: 402); Ahrens (2006: 138).
181 See Frei et al (2009: 404).
182 Flick Trial 32. 
183 See Frei et al (2009: 403); Ahrens (2006: 139), Bähr et al (2008: 590).
184 See Stallbaumer (1999: 1); Turner Jr., Henry Ashby: Big Business and the Rise of Hitler, in: The 
American Historical Review (1969) Vol. 75 (pp. 56 – 70) 56 et seq.
185 See Stallbaumer (1999: 1); Ahrens (2006: 131); Wiesen (2001: ,
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rendous crimes were not ideological Nazi fanatics. In many more instances, they 
rather acted scrupulously profit-oriented and applied Nazi ideology as much as it 
served their own financial gains. Taking over former Jewish property for example 
was often simply regarded as a very easy way to improve one's own economic posi-
tion and did not require an extreme anti-Semitic attitude. The predominant state of 
mind of German industrialist was rather amoralism and opportunism rather than ideo-
logical persuasion.186  
This misconception of the role of the German industry in the Third Reich by the pro-
secution has to be stressed, because it had a strong impact on the prosecutors' argu-
mentation, the defence strategy of the attorneys and eventually on the final outcome 
of the whole trial.187
4. Defence Strategy
Already at a very early stage and long before the actual trial started, Flick and his as-
sociates took several precautions in order to avoid potential charges before Allied 
criminal courts.188 When it became clear that Germany was going to lose the war, they 
began to destroy any incriminating documents and at the same time looked for exon-
erating documents.189 Before and during the court proceedings, Flick and associates 
approached several persons, including ministry officials, other industrialists and op-
ponents of the Nazi regime and requested them to issue exculpatory affidavits.190 In 
many instances, these persons agreed to write these affidavits and they were con-
sequently presented before the military tribunal. As an example, well-known German 
pastor and oppositionist Martin Niemöller gave a written statement in favour of de-
fendant Steinbrinck, emphasising that the latter was purportedly a conscious Christian 
and “man of entirely honorable character” despite his SS membership.191
186 See Stallbaumer (1999: 15)
187 See Ahrens (2006: 138).
188 See Priemel (2007: 625).
189 See Bähr et al (2008: 604).
190 See Priemel (2007: 626).
191 Flick Trial 340.
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In response to the prosecution's allegations, the defendants and their lawyers drew a 
completely different image of the role of the Flick company during the Third Reich. 
In fact, they maintained that it was not the person Friedrich Flick, but German in-
dustry itself which was on the bench.192 Flick was seen as a mere representative, a 
symbol; thus a large part of the trial proceedings turned out to become a fight over the 
interpretation of the role of German industry during the Nazi era.193
Understandably, the defendants brought up a very different reading of the relationship 
between businessman and the Nazi government. The defendants were allegedly “not 
the hammer, but the anvil” of the dictatorial regime, as defence lawyer Kranzbühler 
illustrated his viewpoint.194
According to the defendants' version of history, the political leadership in the Nazi 
state had almost omnipotent powers, degrading industrialist and other powerful busi-
nessmen into a position of merely receiving orders from the state.195 Freedom of mak-
ing one's own economic-based decisions had allegedly almost ceased to exist since 
the Nazi party's rise to power. Thus, it was argued, the defendants had no other choice 
but to take part in criminal state programmes such as forced labour and spoliation of 
foreign countries' economies.196
Flick's contributions to the SS and the Circle of Friends of Heinrich Himmler were la-
belled as an “insurance”.197 Disobedience to the Nazi governments order would have 
led to immediate threats, including even the deportation to a concentration camp. 
Some defendants even went so far as to describe themselves as being almost resist-
ance fighters.198
Thus, all responsibility was basically put upon the Nazi government.199 However, in 
cases where it was impossible to blame the guilt solely on the political leadership, a 
192 See Flick Trial 161; Ahrens (2006: 141).
193 See Bähr et al (2008: 635); Ahrens (2006: 140); Jung (1992: 65 et seq.).
194 See Jung (1992: 65); Ahrens (2006: 140).
195 See Jung (1992: 65); Drobisch (1999: 128).
196 See Jung (1992: 66). 
197 Flick Trial 390.
198 See Frei et al (2009: 421).
199 See Drobisch (1999: 128).
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different defence strategy was taken. Especially in respect of the slave labour count, 
the defendants argued that the leading officials of the Flick empire had no influence 
on the concrete working conditions of the forced workers and emphasised the alleged 
decentralised structure of the Flick Concern.200 Initially, the defendants denied that 
any inhuman treatment of workers had existed at all.201 At a later state, it was argued 
that maltreatment of forced workers was not part of the company's organisation but 
instead the result of excesses by low ranking officials.202
The battle before the court was also a battle about terminology. While the prosecutors 
always referred to the terms “slave labourers” or “forced labourers”, defence counsel 
was cautious to use only the word “foreign labourers”, a quite euphemistic transcrip-
tion of the factual working conditions.203 
During the cross-examination of witnesses, the defence counsel also showed a re-
markably harsh treatment of the victims who were forced to work in the companies of 
the Flick empire.204 Former forced labourers who worked for several years under in-
humane conditions in one of Flick's companies were discredited for purportedly being 
hate-filled liars with inferior character.205 This manner of examining the witnesses by 
the defence nevertheless seemed to have had some effect on the judges, as it is illus-
trated by the Presiding Judge Sears' asking a former forced worker without  showing 
any hint of irony: “You had a small glass of wine at the evening meal, didn’t you? 
Did you have a little wine with the evening meal?”. 206
5. Main Legal Issues
During the trial, the occurrence of various facts was denied, a lack of knowledge was 
claimed or other persons were said to have been responsible.207 Basically all legal is-
200 See Jung (1992: 69); Bähr et al (2008: 636).
201 See Jung (1992: 68).
202 See Jung (1992: 68).
203 See Bähr et al (2008: 626); Jung (1992: 66).
204 See Bähr et al (2008:  638); Jung (1992: 84).
205 See Jung (1992: 84).
206 Cited from Bush (2009: 1219).
207 See Drobisch (1999: 128 ).
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sues were contested by the defence, for example the jurisdiction of the tribunal and 
the validity of Control Council Law No. 10 were put into question.208 Over a dozen 
times, the counsel assumed that the prohibition of retroactive punishment (nulla  
poena sine lege) had been violated.209 In the following, some of the main legal debates 
of the Flick case will be illustrated. 
a) Direct Liability of Civilians Under International Criminal Law
Before the Trial of the Major War Criminals and the decision of the IMT, it was very 
doubtful whether individuals could be held personally criminally responsible under 
international law. The IMT, however, gave strong support to this position; and with 
reference to international legal documents and authorities stated that individual crim-
inal responsibility indeed exists under international law.210 The presumably most fam-
ous statement of the IMT on this issue is that “Crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”211 As the 
IMT judgement constituted a binding precedent for the Nuremberg follow-up trials,212 
this legal concept could hardly be contended by the defence counsel in the Flick trial. 
Nonetheless, the defence lawyers argued that since international law in general only 
binds states, only state officials can be hold individually liable for breaches of any in-
ternational law provisions.213 The defendants in the Flick trials were charged for 
crimes committed out of their private position, and therefore it was argued that inter-
national criminal law is not applicable in this situation. They supported their position 
with a written legal opinion provided by a German expert on international law, Prof. 
Karl Kraus.214
208 See Drobisch (1999: 128).
209 See Priemel (2007: 644); Jung (1992: 165 et seq.).
210 See Jung (1992: 171 et seq.).
211 IMT Judgement 55.
212 See Military Government in the American Zone, Ordinance No 7 of 18 October 1946 
(“Organization and Powers of Certain Military Tribunals”), Art. X.
213 Flick Trial 162.
214 See Jung (1992: 181).
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The prosecution rejected this position completely.215 They argued that no distinction 
between private persons and public officials could be found in CCL No. 10.216 The ar-
gumentation of the defence was regarded as being part of the outdated doctrine that 
only states were bound by the norms of international law.217 Prosecutor Telford 
Taylor furthermore argued that a state practice of indicting private citizens exists.218 
As an example of this assumed state practice, Taylor referred to the failed indictment 
of Gustav Krupp in the Trial of the Major War Criminals.219 Presiding Judge Sears, 
though, was very sceptical on whether this case would in fact constitute a valid pre-
cedent.220 As another precedent, Taylor cited the case against German industrialist 
Herrmann Röchling who had been tried before a French military tribunal after World 
War I.221 
As a conclusion on this issue, Taylor held that “this entire line of defense, which has 
been put forward is, we believe, so flimsy that we doubt that defense counsel ever in-
tended it to be taken seriously on its own merits.”222
b) Individual Accountability and Modes of Participation
In order to establish criminal liability of Flick and his associates, it was of crucial im-
portance to prove that their actions fell under the terms of criminal behaviour defined 
in the elements of the crimes in CCL No. 10.  In her analysis, the author Jung de-
scribes this aspect as the “most difficult issue” of the whole trial.223 The core diffi-
culty arose out of the fact that the slave labour programme, the Aryanisation policy as 
well as the spoliation of foreign economies were in the first place state-organised 
crimes.224 However, the defendants in the Flick trial all took part in these state pro-
grammes by various forms of collaboration with Nazi authorities, playing a more or 
215 See Jung (1992: 187).
216 Flick Trial 1026.
217 Flick Trial 1026.
218 See Jung (1992: 187).
219 Flick Trial 1026.
220 See Flick Trial 1927; Jung (1992: 188).
221 Flick Trial 1028.
222 Flick Trial 1031.
223 See Jung (1992: 47).
224 See IMT Judgement 71 et seq. on slave labour, 75 et seq. on persecution of the jews; on spoliation 
see e.g. 47.
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less active role. From a legal point of view, the crucial task was to determine a stand-
ard of liability, by defining for which crimes the defendants could be held accountable 
for. 
Control Council Law No. 10 contained provisions on the modes of participation in 
Art II 2a-e, which reads as follows:
Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed 
to have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was 
(a) a principal or 
(b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the 
same or 
(c) took a consenting part therein or 
(d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or 
(e) was a member of any organization or group connected with the commission of 
any such crime
Given the great importance of the whole matter, it is a surprise that no real attempt of 
establishing a coherent standard of liability was undertaken throughout the whole tri-
al. 
In the indictment, the prosecution listed the modes of participation contained in CCL 
No. 10 Art II 2a-e.225 During the following proceedings though, no clear reference to 
these modes was made, instead the prosecution merely spoke of “main perpetrator”, 
“culprits” etc. In many instances, the prosecution used the term “responsible” in con-
nection with the defendants' relationship to the crimes committed.226 But it is not pos-
sible to make out a clear meaning of this term, neither to subsume it under the com-
monly known modes of criminal participation.227 At one point, defence counsel 
Siemers took on this issue, emphasising that with the “extraordinarily comprehensive 
225 See Flick Trial 13.
226 See Jung (1992: 49).
227 See Jung (1992: 49).
- 31 -
 
 
 
 
forms of participation” in this provision, one hundred thousand German industrial-
ists, their assistants and labourers must have been war criminals in the eyes of the 
prosecution.228
A large part of the disputes between the defence lawyers and the prosecution were 
dealing with questions if the defendants' collaboration with Nazi authorities amounted 
to own criminal responsibility or whether the crimes concerned were basically com-
mitted by the Nazi government.229 However, a clear dogmatic approach to the stand-
ard of liability can nowhere be found. Likewise, the judges at the Flick trial have not 
attempted to subsume the defendants' behaviour under the provisions of CCL No. 10 
Art II 2 a -e, either. As a consequence, the whole issue remained rather unclear.
c) Necessity and Duress
The core argument of the defence, which was brought up dozens of times throughout 
the trial, was that the defendants had committed their acts due to constant threats of 
the Nazi regime.230 Already in the beginning of his opening statement for defendant 
Flick, lawyer Dix stressed the cruelty and mercilessness of the Nazi government for-
cing its own citizens to commit iniquitous acts.231 He assumed that the defendants' be-
haviour “was their tragedy, but not their guilt”. 232 Following their way of interpreting 
the Nazi past, it was alleged that the Allies were even unable to conceive the true ex-
tent of the Nazi terror, leading all businessmen to working under the threat of being 
sent to concentration camps.233 Although this argumentation was a substantial aspect 
of the general strategy of the defence, it was employed in particular with regard to the 
forced labour charges, by stating that anyone in Germany who would have refused to 
employ forced workers or concentration camp inmates would have been sentenced to 
228 Flick Trial 162.
229 See Bähr et al (2008: 635).
230 See Ahrens (2006: 140); Bower (1989: 248); Priemel (2007: 627); Frei et al (2009: 424). See also 
Telford Taylor, Flick Trial 1037, stating that necessity “seems to us the ultimate defense in this 
case”. 
231 Flick Trial 115.
232 Flick Trial 115.
233 See Priemel (2007: 629).
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death.234 But, in the words of Dix, “no legal obligation exists to die a martyr's  
death”.235 
The prosecution, however, completely denied that the defendants had ever been in a 
situation of constant and severe pressure from the Nazi authorities.236 Any evidence 
presented by the defence in this respect had assumable only shown that Flick and his 
associates had lived under a dictatorship, but not that they had actually been coerced 
into any unwanted business practices.237 According to Taylor, “not one iota of proof” 
had been introduced which would have justified the assumption of a situation of ne-
cessity.238 Furthermore, the prosecution emphasised that the defendants had not sud-
denly and unexpectedly found themselves living in a dictatorial regime. On the con-
trary, they had supported and facilitated the establishment and stabilisation of the 
Nazi rule in Germany from the very beginning.239
In his final statement on the behalf of all defendants, Flick emphasised their role as 
alleged victims again, stating that “Nobody of the large circle of persons who know 
my fellow defendants and myself, will be willing to believe that we committed crimes 
against humanity, and nothing will convince us that we are war criminals.”240
6. The Verdict
On 22 December 1947, the judges delivered their verdict in the Flick trial. Friedrich 
Flick was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment.241 Otto Steinbrinck received a 
prison sentence of five years and Bernhard Weiss of two and a half years.242 Konrad 
Kaletsch, Hermann Terberger and Odilo Burkart were acquitted.243  
Generally, the judges left no doubts that private citizens were bound by the rules of 
international criminal law.244 They also did not find the principle of nulla poena sine 
234 Flick Trial 132.
235 Flick Trial 132.
236 Flick Trial 1032.
237 Flick Trial 1039.
238 Flick Trial 1039.
239 Flick Trial 1041.
240 Flick Trial 1187.
241 Flick Trial 1223.
242 Flick Trial 1223.
243 Flick Trial 1223.
244 See Priemel (2007: 644).
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lege to be violated.245 In their reasoning, nevertheless, the judges followed the line of 
the defence to a large degree.246 They in particular largely accepted the defendants' de-
fence of necessity. 247
With respect to count one, the court stressed that the launching, the implementation 
and the organisation of the slave-labour policy was first and foremost a state pro-
gramme.248 The judges took it for granted that the defendants were “not desirous of 
employing foreign labour or prisoners of war”.249 The court acknowledged that CCL 
No 10. Article II 4 b) contained a provision according to which it was impossible to 
use “superior orders” as a defence,250 however the general defence of “necessity” was 
seen as being still applicable.251 Furthermore, the judges believed the defendants' as-
sertion that severe penalties including the death sentence would have been imposed 
by the Nazi state in case of any refusal to accept forced workers.252 Thus, the court re-
garded all cases of forced labour in the Flick Concern as justified by necessity, with a 
single exception.253 Only in the case of the Linke-Hofman-Werke, where it was 
clearly proven that Bernhard Weiss with the approval of Friedrich Flick had applied 
for an increase in their quota of forced labourers, the court denied this defence.254 The 
court furthermore held that the defendants had very little influence on the actual 
working conditions as the day-to-day administration of the factories was too remote 
from the Flick headquarters.255 
In respect of count two, the spoliation of foreign economies, the court found Friedrich 
Flick alone guilty and acquitted all other defendants.256 But as in the case with count 
one, the court stressed that it was primarily a government policy of which Flick him-
self had allegedly only little knowledge: “If [Flick's acts] added anything to this pro-
245 See Priemel (2007: 644).
246 See Frei et al (2009: 426 et seq.). 
247 See Weinke (2006: 86); Bush (2009: 1218).
248 Flick Trial 1196.
249 Flick Trial 1197.
250 Flick Trial 1200.
251 Flick Trial 1201.
252 Flick Trial 1197.
253 See Weinke (2006: 86).
254 See Flick Trial 1198.
255 Flick Trial 1199.
256 Flick Trial 1212.
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gram of spoliation, it was in a very small degree ”.257 The judges applied a very re-
strictive interpretation of the Hague Convention of 1907, considering the defendants' 
behaviour mostly as results of the Nazi government's occupation, thus being of no 
great relevance to international law.258 Even Steinbrinck, who acted as a government 
trustee for five years in occupied countries, was acquitted on this count.259
The prosecution suffered their biggest defeat on count three, though, the Aryanisation 
of Jewish property.260 The judges refused to claim jurisdiction over crimes against hu-
manity which occurred before 1939 and furthermore denied that Flick's acquisition of 
Jewish companies amounted to “persecution” as defined in CCL No. 10 Article II c) 
after all.261 Unlike the Nuremberg Charter, CCL No. 10 expressly did not require a 
link between crimes against humanity and aggressive war. The judges in the Flick tri-
al nevertheless read CCL No. 10 in the light of the decision of the IMT, thereby still 
requiring this nexus and holding that the military tribunal had no jurisdiction over any 
crimes committed prior to 1 September 1939.262 By way of obiter dictum, the judges 
reasoned that Flick's and his associates' involvement in the Aryanisation process 
would not even have constituted a crime against humanity if the tribunal had jurisdic-
tion.263 According to their opinion, “persecution” as defined in CCL No. 10 Art II c) 
has to be understood very narrowly: only acts against the life and liberty of a civilian 
population amount to “persecution”, acts against the property would clearly not.264 
Probably due to a misconception of the reality of the Aryanisation as it had occurred 
in Germany, the judges assumed that such forced sales may only be judicially re-
viewed before a court of equity, but not before a war crime tribunal.265
257 Flick Trial 1208.
258 See Drobisch (1999: 129).
259 See Bähr et al (2008: 427).
260 See Bähr et al (2008: 428).
261 See Flick Trial 1216; Bush (2009: 1185).
262 Flick Trial 1212.
263 Flick Trial 1213.
264 Flick Trial 1215.
265 Flick Trial 1214.
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Counts four and five, Flick's support of the circle of friend of Heinrich Himmler and 
Steinbrinck's membership in the SS were decided by the court under one heading.266 
Although the factual support was undeniable, the judges assumed that none of the de-
fendants were anti-Semitic and that basically all affiliation with the Nazis served as 
an “insurance” not to become the subject of Nazi repressions themselves.267 The 
judges even believed the defendants' allegations of having been supporters of opposi-
tionist groups, stating that “Flick knew in advance of the plot on Hitler's life in July 
1944, and sheltered one of the conspirators”268.
The fact that the outcome of the trial was observed as rather convenient for the de-
fendants is well illustrated by a statement of Telford Taylor in his final report on the 
Nuremberg Trials, calling the verdict in the Flick case  “exceedingly (if not excess-
ively) moderate and conciliatory.”.269
Chapter Four: Historical Context – Increasing Unwillingness to Prosecute 
German Businesses in the Beginning of the Cold War
1. Further Trials of Industrialists
The Flick case was only the first post-World War II trial involving representatives of 
the industry and economy and several others were about to follow.270
Four month after the beginning of the Flick trial, the directors of the I.G. Farben were 
indicted before a U.S. military tribunal in “Case No 6” of the Nuremberg follow-up 
trials.271 Out of the twenty-three defendants, ten received sentences between one and 
266 Flick Trial 1216.
267 Flick Trial 1221.
268 Flick Trial 1222.
269 See Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Trials under Control Council Law No. 10, 1949 187. Digital version available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NT_final-report.html (accessed on 17 October 2010).
270 For a more detailed analysis of the other business trials, see for example Lippman (1995: 181 et 
seq.); Danner (2006:658 et seq.); Jacobson, Kyle: Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges 
of Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity, in: The Air Force Law Review (2005), Vol. 56 (pp. 167-231) 177. 
271 See U.S. v. Karl Krauch et al, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law No. 10 – Vol. 7, 8. See Jessberger, Florian: Die I.G. Farben vor Gericht 
- Von den Ursprüngen eines "Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrechts", in: JuristenZeitung 2009, Vol. 19 (pp. 
924 – 932) 924.
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eight years in prison for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, while 
the others were acquitted.272
“Case No 10” dealt with the management of the Krupp Concern.273 Compared to the 
other Nuremberg follow-up trials against industrialists, the judges in the Krupp trial 
imposed the stiffest penalties.274 Krupp and two of his managers received twelve years 
imprisonment and out of the twelve defendants, only one was acquitted.275
In the Ministries Trial (Case No. 10),276 Dr. Karl Rasche, director of the Dresdner 
Bank was acquitted for having granted loans to the security police SS.277 Bruno Tesch 
and Karl Weinbacher were tried and sentenced to death before a British court for their 
selling of poisonous Zyklon B to German concentration camps.278 In 1948, the direct-
ors of the Roechling company were tried before a French court. Herrmann Roechling 
was held criminally liable for the spoliation of French factories and machineries and 
for using forced labourers.279
Compared to other industrialists' trials, the Flick trial was the one with the mildest 
sentences.280 And while the judges sitting at other war crime tribunals generally 
agreed that necessity constituted a defence under international criminal law, they were 
much more reluctant in accepting that the factual requirements, i.e. an imminent 
threat to life and liberty, were actually given.281 One author argues that according to 
the judges' reasoning in the Flick trial, Bruno Tesch should in fact have been acquit-
ted.282 A comparison of the business trials furthermore shows a common characterist-
ic: the strategy of the U.S. prosecutors of focussing excessively on the political net-
working and on an assumed wide Nazi conspiracy of an “economic gang” eventually 
272 See Jessberger (2009: 926).
273 U.S. v. Alfried Krupp et al, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law No. 10 – Vol. 9.
274 See (1992: 213); Weinke (2006: 90) .
275 See Jung (1992: 213); Priemel (2007: 645).
276 U.S. v. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 – Vol. 12.
277 See Lippman (1995: 267).
278 See Lippman (1995: 182).
279 See Lippman (1995: 184).
280 See Weinke (2006: 86).
281 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 557).
282 See Bower (1989: 249).
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benefited the defendants.283 On the one hand, it gave the accused the possibility to 
whitewash their history by presenting a very favourable interpretation of their Nazi 
past in court.284 Their cooperation through the Industry Office ensured that this inter-
pretation was reasonably consistent and would also reach the general public. The 
judges on the other hand generally insisted on the proof of individual guilt, thus dis-
missing a number of charges.285 
With regard to the I.G. Farben trial, one assistant of the prosecution criticised their 
own strategy afterwards, stating that it would have been better to put Auschwitz on 
the top of the indictment instead of spending so much effort and time on the com-
pany's general involvement in Nazi politics.286
2. Release and Economic Comeback
Friedrich Flick never had to serve the full length of the seven years prison sentence he 
had received. When deciding upon his punishment, the judges already stated that the 
time Flick spent in custody before and during the trial was to be deducted.287 But 
Flick did not even have to serve the remaining time. He applied to the American High 
Commissioner for a pardon, but before the matter had been decided, he was released 
from prison for good behaviour on the 25 August 1950 after serving two thirds of his 
sentence.288 
However, the American High Commissioner in Germany, John McCloy was rather 
eager to grant a pardon to those industrialists who were convicted during the Nurem-
berg follow-up trials. By 1951, all convicted German industrialists were released.289 
Interestingly, McCloy used in fact the mild sentences in the Flick trial as an argument 
for the pardons, stating that the other industrialists' guilt was not bigger than that of 
Friedrich Flick.290
283 See Ahrens (2006: 149).
284 See Ahrens (2006: 143 et seq.).
285 See Ahrens (2006: 146).
286 See Ahrens (2006: 143).
287 Flick Trial 1228.
288 See Frei et al (2009: 435).
289 See Bush (2009: 1193).
290 See Bower (1989: 254); Danner (2006: 267).
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Being a convicted war criminal nearly had no negative influence on the subsequent 
careers of those industrialists indicted at Nuremberg. For instance, many of the I.G. 
Farben directors were appointed to leading positions in successor companies such as 
Bayer chemicals.291 The same holds true for Friedrich Flick and his associates. In the 
following years of the German economic miracle (“Wirtschaftswunder”), the Flick 
Concern was among those companies making most profits and further expanding their 
business activities. Within few years, Friedrich Flick himself became Germany's 
wealthiest man, again.292 
Despite the huge assets of Flick's industrial empire, he was extremely reluctant to pay 
any damages to his former forced labourers.293 While many other companies which 
employed forced labourers during the Third Reich after lengthy negotiations finally 
agreed to finance funds for the victims and relatives of the forced labour policy, Flick 
refused any payments.294 Until his death in 1972, he showed no hindsight of the in-
justice done to the tens of thousands forced labourers in his companies.295 
3. “Victor's Justice” and “Allies' Justice” - The Political Implications of the 
Flick Trial 
Given the fact that relatively few industrialists were indicted (compared to state offi-
cials), the sentences received were rather mild on average. And as quick pardons en-
abled many of them to pursue very successful careers in the early years of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, some observers speak of a “near-total impunity for big busi-
ness”.296 Whether such a general assessment is fully correct shall not be decided in 
this work, but it is worth taking a closer look at the broader political implications of 
the Flick case.
Whether the Nuremberg War Crime Trials were genuine “legal” trials guided solely 
by the rule of law or if political aspects stood in the foreground has been a hot topic 
291 See Danner (2006: 267).
292 See Danner (2006: 267).
293 See Priemel (2008: 703 et seq.)
294 See Ferencz (1986: 212).
295 See Ferencz (1986: 212).
296 See Bush (2009: 1140).
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of discussion during the trials itself and for the following decades as well.297 The most 
common argument in this discussion is that of alleged “victor's justice”.298 Commonly 
used by German lawyers and politicians but also found in the American debate, it was 
assumed that the victorious powers applied very different - and thus discriminatory - 
criminal rules to the citizens of their former enemy state in comparison to their own 
troops.299  
The accusation of alleged “victor's justice” had also been brought up a number of 
times by the defence counsel in the Flick trial.300 This is illustrated, for example, by 
defence attorney Dr. Dix' questioning the judges: “Do you not believe, Your Honors,  
that [...] German judges, in a different outcome of the war, would inversely have been 
under the obligation to exercise the most stringent self-discipline and the highest ob-
jectivity?”301  
Although the trial clearly had the function to establish the individual guilt of the ac-
cused, the fact that Friedrich Flick had also the role of a representative of German in-
dustry in general cannot be completely rebutted.302 However, the defence counsel was 
reasonably successful in employing this state of affairs as an argument to denounce 
the prosecution of pursuing an anti-capitalist agenda.303
These accusations by the defence fell on fertile grounds, as the political climate in the 
U.S.A. and the attitude towards war crime trials in Germany had significantly 
changed since the end of World War II. The Soviet Union and the spread of Com-
munism seemed to many right-wing U.S. politicians to constitute a far greater threat 
then the defeated Germany and National-Socialism.304  Robert Jackson himself had 
already pointed out that German industry would be needed for strengthening Ger-
297 See also an assessment later issued by defence counsel Kranzbühler, who has differentiated view 
on the trials but still emphasises their political purpose; Kranzbühler, Otto: Nuremberg Eighteen 
Years Afterwards, in: De Paul Law Review, (1964 – 1965), Vol. 14 (pp. 333 – 347).
298 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 25).
299 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 25).
300 See Jung (1992: 40).
301 Flick Trial 120.
302 See Ahrens (2006: 138).
303 See Priemel (2007: 635); Jung (1992: 221). 
304 See Bush (2009: 1121).
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many against Soviet influence in the future, and this point of view was shared by 
many in the U.S. administration.305 Especially with regard to the business trials, the 
prosecutor's team around Telford Taylor had been denounced as being “hot heads” 
and “Morgenthau-boys” by the far right.306 In autumn 1947, when the Flick trial was 
about to end, Republican senators in the United States alleged that business trials 
would serve Moscow's interests and went even so far as to denunciate members of the 
Nuremberg staff of being communists.307 
Thus, especially Marxist scholars claimed that the verdict against Flick was first and 
foremost a political decision.308 One author asserts that the reasons for this assumed 
error of judgement were  “not only sympathy and imperialistic bonhomie felt by 
judges towards the defendants, but in the first place instructions from USA”.309 
Assuming such a direct political exertion of influence on the judges, however, is un-
founded.310 One may very well question whether the judges in the Flick trial had a 
correct perception of the dimension of the defendants' crimes and can likewise criti-
cise parts of their legal reasoning – but they were clearly no “political marionettes”.311 
Unlike judges in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, the judges in the Flick trial had 
practised for many years in a country under the rule of law. This does not make them 
immune to being influenced by the general political climate. But it seems very im-
probable that they would be accepting direct political orders, especially since no such 
evidence exists.312 
Furthermore, such a theory is disproved when comparing the Flick trial with the other 
business trials. Assuming a general influence of the U.S. leadership on the military 
tribunals would be particular inconsistent with the outcome of the Krupp trial, where 
305 See Bush (2009: 1122).
306 See Bush (2009: 1122).
307 See Bush (2009: 1231).
308 See for example Drobisch, Klaus in: Thieleke, Karl-Heinz (ed.): “Fall 5” Anklageplädoyer,  
ausgewählte Dokumente, Urteil im Flickprozeß, Berlin, Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften 
(1965) 9 et seq.
309 See Drobisch in Thieleke (1965: 9), translation by author.
310 See Jung (1992: 211).
311 See Jung (1992: 217).
312 See Jung (1992: 213).
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relatively harsh sentences were imposed.313 The political climate of the cold war 
seemed to have affected the Flick trial in some way, but it remains difficult to meas-
ure;314 other factors connected with the specific circumstances of the trial such as the 
very skilled defence counsel were probably more decisive.315
Taking everything into account, the Flick trial was definitely not a case of “Victor's 
justice”. One may call it “Allies' justice”,316 as German businessmen were by many 
regarded as future allies against communism. But it was still a judicial decision, not 
one made by a political body.317 
Chapter Five: Critical Evaluation and Relevance for Current International 
Criminal Law 
1. Further Developments in International Criminal Law
The Nuremberg trials were of fundamental significance for the establishment of an in-
ternational criminal law order. One may very well describe the Nuremberg charter as 
“the birth certificate of international criminal law”.318 Though not nearly as well-
known as the Trial Against the Major War Criminals, the importance of the Nurem-
berg follow-up trials should not be underestimated.319 The legal principles established 
by the military tribunals constitute customary international law320 and therefore influ-
ence the application of international criminal law up to the present day.321 
Since the post-World War II trials, international criminal law underwent major devel-
opments. During the Cold War, the principles developed at Nuremberg were affirmed 
numerous times by the United Nations, inter alia by the ratification of the Genocide 
313 See Jung (1992: 212).
314 See Bush (2009: 1218).
315 See Jung (1992: 221), stating that reasons for the verdict can be found rather in the “microcosm” of 
the trial then in the “macrocosm” of the political situation.
316 See Jessberger (2009: 930), who uses the German term (“Verbündetenjustiz”) in respect of the 
verdict in the I.G. Farben trial
317 See Jung (1992: 221).
318 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 15).
319 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 37).
320 See Werle (2009: marginal nos. 141 et seq.).
321 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 37).
- 42 -
 
 
 
 
Convention in 1948 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.322 State practice by way of 
applying these rules in criminal trials though lacked completely.323 This situation 
changed in the 1990s, when the UN established the ad hoc tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY) and 
for Rwanda (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR).324 The most import-
ant step in the development of international criminal law was finally made with the 
adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998.325 
For the first time in history, a comprehensive codification of the core substantive and 
procedural norms of international criminal law, including a number of general prin-
ciples, has been agreed upon.326 
However, the liability of industrialists and other businessmen for committing crimes 
under international law did not play a role at all in the post-World War II jurispru-
dence.327 Both the ICTY and the ICTR were solely concerned with the criminal ac-
countability of political and military leaders, members of the private business sector 
were not prosecuted for possible involvement in international crimes.328 So far, out of 
the  few  cases  pending  at  the  ICC,  none  is  concerned  with  businessmen,  either. 
However, in 2003 the prosecutor at the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, issued a state-
ment regarding the situation in the Congo.329 Ocampo emphasised the importance of 
investigating  the  economic  background  of  the  crimes  occurred.  In  particular,  the 
activities of foreign organisations who were involved in the trade of gold and dia-
monds were in the focus. But it does not seem as if any further steps in this directions 
have been taken so far.330
322 See Werle (2009: marginal nos. 40, 42).
323 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 44).
324 See Werle (2009: marginal nos. 45 et seq.).
325 See Werle (2009: marginal nos. 56, 66): “for now, the final milestone in the development of 
international criminal law”.
326 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 74).
327 See Jacobson (2005: 201); Jessberger (2009: 931), Bush (2009: 1102).
328 See Jacobson (2005: 201).
329 See Press Release from the Office of the Prosecutor, (ICC-OTP-20030716–27) 3, available at 
http://icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2003/press%20conference
%20of%20the%20prosecutor%20_%20press%20release (accessed on 19 October 2010). 
330 See Jessberger (2009: 932).
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Trials against corporate officials for violations of international law have taken place 
before U.S. courts for many years, based on the U.S. Alien Tort Statute (ATS).331 
While the ATS jurisprudence refers to the precedents of the Nuremberg trials and also 
to the Flick case,332 they are in substance civil tort claims and thus only partially rel-
evant for criminal law liability. One case involving the responsibility of a corporation 
under international criminal law has recently come up in the Netherlands, however.333
Although there exists a lack of judicial precedences despite the post-World War II tri-
als, the liability of businessmen under international criminal law has become a topic 
in the legal academic debate.334 As a matter of legal doctrine, this issue is concerned 
with Article 25 of the ICC Statute and culminates around the question if and to what 
extent actions of corporate officials and other private economic actors may fall under 
the modes of participation established therein.335 A particular difficulty lies in determ-
ining the scope of the provision on aiding and abetting (Article 25 No. 3 c of the ICC 
Statute), since a too broad understanding would lead to the criminalisation of every-
day behaviours generally accepted as socially adequate.336 The doctrinal debate on the 
appropriate legal standards and thresholds is still in its initial phase, though.337  
Since the Nuremberg trials constitute to a large degree customary international law, 
some scholars have conducted legal historical studies on the business trials in order to 
331 See Skinner, Gwynne: Nuremberg's Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials' Influencing on 
Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts under the Alien Tort Statute, in: Albany Law Review 
(2008) Vol. 71 (321 – 367); Ramasastry, Anita: Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to 
Rangoon – An Examination of Forced Labour Cases and their Impact on the Liability of 
Multinational Corporations, in: Berkeley Journal of International Law (2002), (91 – 159); Herz, 
Richard: Corporate Alien Tort Liability and the Legacy of Nuremberg, in: Gonzaga Journal of  
International Law (2007), (76 – 80); Cassel, Doug: Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human 
Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, in: Northwestern University Journal of International  
Human Rights (2008) Vol. 6, (306 et seq.).
332 See for example Ramasatry (2002: 91 et seq.).
333 See Jessberger (2009: 931).
334 See Schabas, William A.: Enforcing international humanitarian law: Catching the accomplices, in: 
International Review of the Red Cross (2001), Vol 83 (pp. 439 – 459); Jacobson (2005: 167 et 
seq.); Jessberger (2009: 924 et seq.).
335 See Schabas (2001: 443).
336 See Schabas (2001: 449).
337 See Jessberger (2009: 931).
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determine their relevance for contemporary international criminal law.338 In a similar 
way, a critical examination of the Flick trial will take place in the following.
2. Critical Evaluation: The Flick Decision from Today's Point of View
Evaluating the Flick trial can be conducted under two viewpoints. Firstly, was the 
court's judgement and legal reasoning convincing and in accordance with the legal 
framework at the time of the decision? Secondly, what relevance has the decision for 
present-day international criminal law? Which particular legal characteristics can be 
regarded as outdated and which are of importance still today? 
In the author's opinion, the most important aspect of the Flick decision is a very gen-
eral one: private citizens such as businessmen are in principle covered by the norms 
of international  criminal  law. From the point  of view of present-day international 
criminal law, such a finding seems somehow self-evident. However, at the time of the 
decision, this issue was far from being uncontroversial.339 It was the IMT which for 
the first time in history established the principle that individuals and not only states 
can be held accountable for committing crimes under international law. But it were 
only public officials such as military, political and administrative leaders of the Nazi 
state which were tried at the Trial of the Major War Criminals. In the following legal 
debates, some sound arguments could be brought up in arguing that only public offi-
cials fall under the scope of international criminal law.340 A main argument states that 
only high public officials act as representatives of the state, therefore criminal liability 
derived from international law solely covers this limited group of persons.341
Therefore, a major achievement of the business trials in general and the Flick trial in 
particular was the extension of individual liability under international law to private 
citizens.342 Industrialists,  merchants,  bankers etc. who are involved in international 
338 See Jessberger (2009: 929); Lippman (1995: 267); Jacobson (2005: 210 et seq.); Danner (2006: 
654 et seq.).
339 See Jung (1992: 170 et seq.).
340 See Jung (1992: 182 et seq.).
341 See Jung (1992: 183).
342 See Danner (2006: 251); Jacobson (2005: 210); Lippman (1995: 267). But See Jung (1992: 191), 
arguing that such liability existed merely on paper due to the extremely wide interpretation of 
necessity by the court.
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crimes have to be aware nowadays that they can be held accountable before interna-
tional courts. This fact has to be stressed, as it is not solely a matter of legal dogmatic 
but also of legal politics.343 
This general achievement of the Flick trial, though, cannot hide a number of short-
comings in several respects. Despite establishing the general principle that business-
men can commit international crimes, the concrete legal standards for determining ac-
countability remain unclear. If one hopes to gain any hints on how to apply and inter-
pret the present-day modes of participation of international criminal law on this mat-
ter, he will be disappointed.344 But one cannot blame this state of affairs solely on the 
judges. For instance, the relevant provisions in CCL No. 10 were extremely broad and 
thus  not  very  helpful.345 Furthermore,  defining  the  applicable  legal  standards  also 
would have required detailed knowledge of contemporaneous German corporate law 
as well  as a thorough understanding of the actual relationship between the private 
economy  and  the  Nazi  state;346 two  factors  which  do  not  seem to  be  have  been 
present. In addition, the prosecutors' strategy of displaying the defendants as “evils” 
entangled in a Nazi conspiracy was eventually counter-productive and unhelpful in 
determining their actual responsibility.347
Secondly, one can raise criticism on the fact that the court restricted Crimes against 
Humanity only to offences committed during wartime. CCL No. 10 expressly aban-
doned this nexus requirement,348 but the judges nevertheless insisted on it, mainly by 
referring to the IMT judgement.349 At the time of the decision, the issue was not dealt 
with uniformly. While the Supreme Court for the British zone claimed jurisdiction for 
crimes against humanity which occurred before the war, other military tribunals fol-
343 See Jessberger (2009: 931).
344 See Jessberger (2009: 931), who comes to similar findings in respect of the I.G. Farben trial.
345 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 444).
346 See Bähr et al (2008: 629).
347 See Jung (1992: 221).
348 See Werle (2009: marginal nos. 36, 783).
349 Flick trial 1212 et seq.
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lowed the line of the Flick decision.350 Today, this nexus requirement can be regarded 
as clearly outdated.351
Furthermore,  the  very  restrictive  interpretation  of  the  Crime  against  Humanity  of 
“persecution” by the court casts doubts.352 The court reasoned that persecution must 
constitute of such acts which are solely and directly aimed at the life and the liberty of 
the victims.353 Thus, as the “Aryanisation” policy targeted primarily at the property 
rights of the Jewish population, this was deemed to fall outside the definition of “per-
secution”.
In general, it is true that the violation of property rights is not always a clear-cut case 
of persecution.354 But one should take into account the severity and the extent of prop-
erty violations and thus  employ a differentiated approach. Especially the ICTY has 
developed a much more sophisticated legal doctrine in this respect.355 While the extor-
tion of a single piece of property will not amount to “persecution” in that sense, the 
situation looks entirely different if a whole civilian population is basically deprived of 
all their belongings.356 Thus, from today's point of view, one can hardly question that 
the “Aryanisation” of Jewish property constituted in fact the crime against humanity 
of persecution.357
Most probably the weakest part of the judgement is however the extensive application 
of the defence of necessity. This is not so much due to the fact that this defence was 
accepted in principle, but from the judges' eagerness to conclude that the actual re-
quirements were present. 
CCL No. 10 contained no provision on necessity, furthermore “superior orders” were 
explicitly excluded from being used as an exculpation.358 The court nevertheless con-
350 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 784).
351 See Werle (2009: marginal nos. 783, 784, 787); see also Art. 7 ICC Statute.
352 See Danner (2006: 252).
353 Flick Trial 1215.
354 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 895).
355 Werle (2009: marginal no. 895).
356 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 895) with further reference to ICTY case law.
357 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 895).
358 CCL No. 10 Article II 4 b.
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cluded that this defence exists under international criminal law.359 In substance, one 
can agree with the court in this respect. Other war crime tribunals have confirmed the 
existence of the defence of necessity in later decisions.360 Necessity and duress are 
now contained in Article 31 (1) d of the ICC Statute and this defence has an important 
role in international case law.361 However, the court's reasoning for establishing this 
defence is not very elaborate. The only authority provided in this regard is Wharton's  
Criminal Law, a standard reference book of U.S. criminal law.362 The overall lack of 
references in the judgement (only six authorities are used all together) was explained 
by the court with a presumably inadequate library.363 It is noteworthy, though, that 
other tribunals in Nuremberg used various references to found their decisions.364 
Even if one cannot apply a statutory definition of this defence and refrains from using 
further  more detailed  authorities  such  as  precedents  and commentaries,  but  refers 
solely to the rudimentary definition given in Wharton's Criminal Law, it remains very 
dubious whether the requirements were actually fulfilled in the Flick case. In the first 
place, the alleged threats to life for industrialists who would refuse to employ forced 
labourers seem extremely far-fetched. The Nazi regime was undoubtedly ruthless and 
willing to use draconian sanctions against any oppositionists. However, this matter is 
not concerned with the question whether or not Flick should have been more active in 
the opposition against the Nazi government. Nobody expected him to actively hide 
Jews like an Oscar Schindler; it is simply about not employing forced labourers. Flick 
would have definitely suffered an economic loss if he had done so, but no historical 
proof exists that any German businessmen were killed or suffered other severe sanc-
tions in similar situations.365 
359 Flick Trial 1200.
360 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 557); Nill-Theobald, Christiane: “Defences” bei Kriegsverbrechen 
am Beispiel Deutschlands und der USA, Freiburg im Breisgau, MPI (1998) 182 et seq.
361 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 557).
362 Flick Trial 1200.
363 See Jung (1992: 197).
364 See Jung (1992: 198), specifically mentioning the Jurists Trial.
365 See Bower (1989: 248): When Friedrich Flick was heard as a witness at the I.G. Farben Trial, he 
was unable to present a single industrialist who had been prosecuted in the Third Reich for refusing 
to employ forced labourers.
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Furthermore, for an act to be justified on grounds of necessity, it has to be necessary 
and reasonable.366 Instead of employing 60.000 forced workers, Flick had a variety of 
other options to avert the alleged threats to his life, such as changing his fields of 
business activity. Finally, necessity in general requires that the perpetrator acted with 
the intention of averting the threat.367 The defendants in the Flick trial, though, had a 
very different intention - profit. 
In his dissenting opinion in the I.G. Farben trial, judge Herbert raised harsh criticism 
against the decision in the Flick trial on necessity and encapsulates the issue by stat-
ing that “Such a doctrine constitutes, in my opinion, unbridled license for the com-
mission of war crimes and crimes against humanity on the broadest possible scale 
through the simple expediency of the issuance of compulsory governmental regula-
tions combined with the terrorism of the totalitarian or police state”.368
3. Concluding Remarks
The tribunal's legal reasoning especially in respect of crimes against humanity as well 
as of the defence of necessity were clear shortcomings of the Flick trial. Furthermore, 
the mild sentences were unproportional, in particular when taking into account the 
harm suffered by the tens of thousands of forced labourers who had to work in the 
Flick Concern. However, this outcome – at least partly – resulted also from the mis-
guided prosecution strategy.369 Under the aspect of litigation tactics, focussing excess-
ively on the political entanglement of the Flick Concern and German industry in gen-
eral provided the defendants and their skilled lawyers with a platform to present their 
very own version of history. But the prosecutors' approach was also questionable 
from the viewpoint of substantial international criminal law, especially in the light of 
the principle of individual guilt. It has to be appreciated that the Flick trial extended 
criminal liability in general to businessmen, but a clear standard of liability taking 
sufficient regard of individual responsibility in such cases still has to be developed.
366 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 561).
367 See Werle (2009: marginal no. 563).
368 I.G. Farben Trial 1310.
369 See Ahrens (2006: 138); Jung (1992: 221).
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